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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
The US-China Trade 
Conflict Will Hit  
Europe and the Euro
While the trade conflict between the US 
and China seems to be abating, their ri-
valry on technology is heating up. Their 
race for leadership will likely extend 
into the monetary realm. China has in-
dicated it could respond to tariffs or 
tech-related measures by the US with 
currency movements. If so, Europe will 
inevitably be dragged into the conflict. 
The euro area needs to be proactive to 
prevent the euro from becoming a vari-
able in an economic conflict in which it 
cannot remain an innocent bystander.
In their last round of negotiations in 
November 2019, the US and China 
seemed to be nearing an interim deal 
on trade, which would prevent further 
escalation in the short term. This posi-
tive development, however, should not 
obscure the profound rivalry that has 
emerged between the two countries 
– a rivalry that will gradually take dif-
ferent forms of strategic competition. 
In summer 2019, US President  Donald 
Trump announced levies of ten per-
cent on a further $300 billion of US 
imports from China effective Sep-
tember 1, 2019. The move, which was 
prompted by the collapse of US-Chi-
nese trade discussions in Shanghai at 
the end of July 2019, brought all $509 
billion of Chinese imports to some lev-
el of tariff. Because China does not 
have the same amount of US imports 
on which to impose tariffs, it has to 
find alternative ways to retaliate if it 
wants to avoid absorbing the full cost 
of these US tariffs.
Beijing has several options. It can rein-
state the tariffs on US cars that it had 
lifted in December 2018 as a gesture 
of goodwill. It can also further cut im-
ports of agricultural goods from the US 
and impose tariffs on oil and gas im-
ports, which would incidentally in-
crease its demand from Iran. Of more 
global consequence, China can use the 
exchange rate to alleviate the pressure 
created by US tariffs on its economy. 
It has already started to do so by let-
ting the exchange rate of the US dol-
lar (USD) against the renminbi (RMB) 
surge through 7.0. This move, though, 
is largely symbolic because what tru-
ly matters is China’s effective exchange 
rate – the rate against all its trading 
partners rather than simply against the 
USD. Still, it was an important warning 
indicating that China can and will ex-
tend the trade conflict to the curren-
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cy realm if necessary. Moreover, in ad-
dition to trade tariffs, other forms of 
rivalry between the US and China – 
for example, investment restrictions 
and regulatory constraints on Chinese 
companies – could bring about a Chi-
nese response via the exchange rate.
CONSEQUENCES BEYOND 
CHINA AND THE US
The transformation of this trade con-
flict, which has so far been bilateral, 
into a currency conflict has far reach-
ing implications. By weakening its ex-
change rate, China is spreading the 
cost of US tariffs on the rest of the 
world and, hence, internationalizing 
the conflict. The euro (EUR), for ex-
ample, has appreciated against the 
RMB since April 2019, which has al-
ready negatively affected the exports 
of the euro area and Germany. Should 
this gradual devaluation continue, it 
will force other countries to take mea-
sures to limit the spillovers; fiscal and 
monetary reactions from other players 
will likely follow. So far, these reactions 
have been contained. But given the im-
portance of China to Asian and glob-
al supply chains, a substantial devalu-
ation would inevitably provoke a chain 
reaction – as the breadth of spillovers 
from the devaluation of the Chinese 
yuan (CNY) in summer 2015 suggests. 
A recent paper finds that trade tariffs 
have more effect on import/export 
elasticities than foreign exchange (FX) 
movements and highlights how large 
a devaluation should be if it were de-
signed to respond to trade tariffs. The 
paper states that, in order to achieve a 
given trade deficit in a world made of 
two countries, a 14 percent deprecia-
tion of the RMB against the USD would 
be necessary to erase the effect of an 
average increase in US import tariffs of 
5 percent.
The effective devaluation of the RMB 
required to offset further American 
tariffs could, therefore, be substan-
tial and would provoke a realignment 
of global exchange rates that includes 
considerable appreciation of the EUR 
and the Japanese yen (JPY). Indeed, 
since February 2016, global exchange 
rate markets have been operating un-
der a confidential framework that was 
agreed upon on the margins of a meet-
ing of the G20 finance ministers and 
central bankers held then in Shang-
hai. After the shock RMB devaluation 
of August 2015, which had unleashed 
destabilizing capital flight from Chi-
na and accelerated the appreciation of 
the USD, the Federal Reserve had tac-
itly agreed to delay its tightening cy-
cle – provided that China also con-
tain depreciation forces weighing on 
the RMB through a mix of interven-
tions and capital controls. This ba-
sic agreement has largely held at the 
Federal Reserve since Jerome H. Pow-
ell became its chairman in early 2018. 
Since then, the Federal Reserve has re-
mained quite sensitive to movement in 
the USD and, along with the US Trea-
sury and US Trade Representative, in-
sistent on China limiting depreciation 
of the RMB. Today, with this agreement 
at the heart of the truce on trade to-
ward which the US and China seem to 
be moving, the Trump administration 
continues to insist on currency stabil-
ity as an essential commitment from 
China. The question is whether China’s 
commitment will last – especially if the 
conflict extends to critical elements 
of China’s technological development. 
The US ban on opening critical 5G net-
works to Chinese telecommunications 
company Huawei or its ban on selling 
microchips to ZTE could, for example, 
be expanded to include a wider set of 
technologies or a wider range of firms.
The use of such alternative barriers 
could intensify the trade conflict in 
the currency realm, inevitably forc-
ing countries with the highest poten-
tial for currency appreciation to shoul-
der a greater part of the burden of the 
adjustment between the US and China. 
The tacit Sino-American agreement 
of 2015 had contributed to the polic-
ing of exchange rate volatility and cap-
ital flows. If China decides to make the 
trade confrontation monetary, it will 
first and foremost affect those surplus 
countries – such as Japan and the eu-
ro area – which had been most enjoy-
ing its indirect benefits. In addition, US 
adjustment efforts to weaken the USD 
might well increase if President Trump 
weighs in himself, intensifying pres-
sure on the Federal Reserve – perhaps 
2016 2017 2018 2019
90
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
91
W41W28W15W2W40W27W14W1W40W27W14W1W40W27W14W1
Index
Figure 1: The People’s Bank of China is Undertaking a Slow, Managed Depreciation
Source: Macrobond: China, FX Indices, China Foreign Exchange Trade System, CFETS RMB Index (SDR Currency Basket), Index
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up to the point of removing its chair-
man and even contemplating currency 
intervention. Trump’s rhetoric against 
recent policy decisions by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) suggests that 
the US administration is alert and al-
so prepared to export the currency 
discussions beyond China. While the 
recent G20 meetings and this sum-
mer’s G7 meeting of finance ministers 
and central bankers in Chantilly have 
made every effort to avoid this sensi-
tive topic by sticking to their previous 
(but vague) commitments on exchange 
rates, they will be insufficient to ad-
dress the breakdown of the Shanghai 
truce.
THE NEED FOR 
COORDINATED ECONOMIC 
POLICY IN EUROPE
These issues, which are likely to erupt 
at any time over the coming years, 
present challenges that Europe is 
wholly unprepared to deal with. The 
euro area’s declaration that it is will-
ing to strengthen the international role 
of the EUR hides the fact that the in-
ternal prerequisites for such strength-
ening are far from given. Broadening 
the circulation of its currency, for in-
stance, would require the euro area 
to extend invoicing in EUR, broaden-
ing the reach of its payment system to 
secure global transactions outside of 
the extraterritorial reach of the Unit-
ed States sanctions regime. This, in 
turn, would require enhancing the role 
of the EUR as a store of value by re-
assuring global private investors about 
the ability of the euro area to stabilize 
both its banking and shadow banking 
systems, which entails extending the 
ECB’s network of swap lines to pre-
vent shortages of EUR liquidity outside 
of Europe. The euro area would also 
need to deepen the market for safe as-
sets available from it to international 
investors. 
Each of these challenges will spark 
profound discussions about economic 
policy coordination in Europe. Indeed, 
in the event of a real escalation, the 
euro area could only respond to for-
eign exchange destabilization caused 
by the US-China conflict if it could de-
liver a coordinated monetary and fiscal 
response on a sufficient scale to avert 
a substantial increase in the EUR’s  real 
effective exchange rate that would fur-
ther reduce inflation expectations and 
growth. The only way to achieve this 
would be a significant and coordinat-
ed fiscal expansion, which would al-
low the ECB to expand its quantita-
tive easing program in response to 
the deflationary impulse provoked by 
the escalation of the trade conflict in 
the currency realm. As it stands, de-
spite growing risks of an economic 
slowdown, the euro area is only plan-
ning to expand by 0.2 percent of GDP 
in 2020. The euro area seems unable to 
challenge the strictures of the stability 
and growth pact, which creates some 
concern about its ability to summon 
the type of policy response that would 
be necessary in the case of a  real cur-
rency conflict. The ECB does indeed 
have the power (under command of 
the Council) to undertake currency in-
tervention, but such an intervention 
would only have limited effects if it 
was not backed by the right domestic 
economic policy.
The reality today is that Europe’s eco-
nomic governance makes it hard to 
imagine that it could combat an all-out 
US-China trade conflict in the curren-
cy realm. The euro area is indeed con-
strained by fiscal rules that would need 
to be revisited in a scenario where 
both the currency and the economy 
may come under such pressure. Eu-
rope might then be held back by a cen-
tral bank that is probably the most in-
dependent in the world and may prove 
reluctant to cooperate with – or be in-
structed by – European finance min-
isters. It is divided on the use of trade 
retaliation and may, therefore, seem 
easier to bully. Consequently, if the eu-
ro area cannot achieve internal eco-
nomic policy coordination, the EUR 
will become the external variable of 
adjustment that absorbs a meaningful 
part of the devaluation of the CNY.
Indeed, the last international curren-
cy arrangements – the Plaza Accord of 
1985 and Louvre Accord of 1987 – were 
held at a time when the USD was more 
dominant and European countries 
each had their own currency. Then, 
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Figure 2: Global Imbalances Remain with Euro Area as Biggest Contributor
Source: Macrobond: IMF BOPS, Balance of Payments, Current Account, Totals, Net USD
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Europe could coordinate with the rest 
of world without really having to coor-
dinate internally first. The rules of the 
game have now changed and – while 
they should, in principle, allow the eu-
ro area to stand taller in these inter-
national trade cum currency tensions 
– internal disagreements might hold 
it back. After such a lengthy period of 
moderation, the potential for mone-
tary instability provoked by escalating 
Sino-American tensions justifies ques-
tioning Europe’s ability to respond. It is 
critical for the euro area to think about 
– and prepare for – such a situation 
because it is, in fact, only by prepar-
ing for such cases that it can achieve 
its stated aim: expanding the interna-
tional role of the EUR and enhancing 
Europe’s sovereignty.
